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D IALECTICAL PRACTICE IN T IBETAN PHILOSOPHICAL 
C ULTURE: AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL INQUIRY 
INTO FORMAL R EASONING 
KENNETH LIBERMAN 
REVIEWED BY D. PHILLIP STANLEY 
In the foreward to the book, the initiator of 
ethnomethodology, Harold Garfinkel , praises 
Liberman's application of his methodology to Tibetan 
monastic debate as an "exceptional ethnography" 
of "reason in its lived, embodied, choreographed 
exhibits of organization al Things in the details" that 
"makes it possible to ask perspicuous, sociological 
questions about the local organizational work of 
formal reasoning" (ix-x). Liberman describes his 
approach as "philosophical anthropology" (296), by 
which he means an "exhaustive microsociological 
account" (27) of the living philosophica l practices 
of a community. 
Liberman asserts that lndologists and Tibetolo-
gists have ignored "almost entirely the life-world 
of Tibetan scholars," due to their focus on the 
philological analysis of texts. They thus " remain 
in capable of comprehending, with anything like a 
basic sociologica l adequacy, South Asian or Tibetan 
philosophical practice as lived traditions" (3, ita lics 
in the original) . He argues that the social practices 
involved in debate play a central role in the emer-
gence of philosophical insights. He notes that "logic 
and reason are devices that assist the philosophers 
in their social task of organizing a philosophical in-
quiry . .. . It is only within a context constituted by the 
forms of social interaction .. . that one can begin to at-
temp t to di ssociate a propositional formulation from 
those activities .. .. That formal reasoning becomes 
transcendental is a social as well as a philosophical 
phenomenon" (85). He observes that "social amne-
sia" regarding the communal roots of philosophical 
insight enables the objectification of insights such 
that they rise to transcendent truths applicable to all 
times and places (p. 104-105). 
Regarding Tibetan debate, Liberman observes that 
the "employment of absurd consequences ... lends to 
Tibetan philosophical discourse a certain Oavor of 
irony, and Tibetan argumentation can become very 
humorous." He highlights the "playfulness with 
which Tibetan philosophers entertain ironies" (189). 
For instance, he desc ribes a debate in which it has 
come to light that "there can be a person who accepts 
profound theses as true and so is a proper member 
of his school of philosophical tenets, yet fails to real-
ize their true import" (191). He describes how "By 
this time the defenders are in full celebration of this 
irony and the insight into the philosopher's life that 
it bears, and so they sustain the patent absurdity .. . 
just wonderfully proposed" by the challenger (191). 
Liberman identifies the emergence of such insights 
as "the acme of Geluk philosophical practice" (191). 
He proposes that the goa l of debate is not simply to 
formally expose a contradiction in the thinking of 
another but to "bring it to life in front of the think-
ers" (181 , italics in original). He states that 'T he pith 
of the Tibetan dialectical sys tem is to be continu-
ally placing every philosophical system at risk" (58) 
and he praises the "rea l world creativity of thinkers 
working with, through , and 'beyond ' the [logical! 
forms" (p. 263). 
Such statements describe the debate practice at its 
best and may appear na1ve out of context. Liber-
man notes that there are scholars who have severely 
criticized the Tibetan debate tradition. For example, he cites 
one scholar's depiction of debate as the "slavish pursuit of 
formali stic argumentation according to the scripts set forth 
in the yig cha [the manuals of one's monastic college)" (266). 
While Liberman acknowledges the ever present potential for 
sterility and sophistry in debate, he takes issue with such 
characterizations as one-sided. He proposes instead a more 
balanced picture. For example, he stresses the role of rhetori-
cal moves in debate, both in their positive use to accentuate 
substantial insights as well as in their negative "diabolical" 
(75) use for sheer sophistry to "win" a debate . These rhetorical 
moves include vague evasive responses by defendants, mis-
representations of a defendant's statements by the challenger, 
bluffing, ridicule, formal claims of contradiction when none 
have occurred, stalls and digressions, verbal harassment, 
derisive laughter, accusative vocal gestures ("Ahaaah! "), "an-
tagonistic wrappings and twirlings of the challenger's rosary" 
(76), and so on. 
Liberman shows considerable insight into the performa-
tive aspects of debate. He appreciates the aesthetics of the 
skillful enactment of the forms of debate, the pleasing union 
of elocution, bodily movements, and logical content. He 
highlights the elegance, rhythm, dignity, the synchronized 
choreography, verbal pirouettes, rhythmic overlaps, rhymes, 
and speaking-as-one of challengers and defenders as they 
work together. Such qualities come and go within specific 
debates. When they arise, they may be accompanied by sig-
nificant content or not, but in either case they add to the 
appeal of debate. Liberman notes that "Tibetan debaters work 
deliberately to direct these energies into a well synchronized, 
smoothly flowing course of dialectics. When the dialectics 
is going well, the energies are flowing freely and there is a 
synergy that is brought to their intellectual concerns" (217). 
These qualities can be seen in the CD that accompanies the 
book and provides a visual and auditory record of all the 
debates that he analyzes . 
Liberman acknowledges the dangers of setting forth the 
tremendous detail involved in applying ethnomethodology to 
debate. He writes: 
In Garfinkel's terms, such local work consists of 'the holy 
hellish concreteness of Lhings.' ... [O]ne becomes swamped by 
the detail s ... A serious risk is whether any audience will have 
the interest or the patience to lea rn such a level of detail. But 
there is no alteni.ative but to try to make one's way through 
what Bar-Hillel calls 'the jungle of daily discourse'." (37) 
Much of the book proceeds by means of detailed analysis 
of small portions of various debates. Many readers will likely 
find a good portion of the debates intelligible, especially if 
they put effort into learning the rudiments of Tibetan debate 
set forth in the book. Tibetan debate tends to be laconic so 
that the meaning or a specific debate term at a specific point 
in a debate may still not be fully clear to a given reader. For-
tunately, one can appreciate Liberman's numerous insights 
without going through all the debates. He has a distinctive 
way of translating the formal debate language into English. 
The result is somewhat awkward but this is at least in part 
due to the formal nature of debate language. Nonetheless, his 
usages are intelligible and consistent. (On a minor note, there 
are a number of typos in his transliterations of the Tibetan 
terminology: gsel should be gsal (68), rte should be of ste 
(88), etc.) 
In summary, Liberman's critique of the neglect of the lived 
social practice of the Tibetan tradition by textually-oriented 
Tibetologists and Indologists is to the point, though he has 
not adequately dealt with how the textual tradition has served 
as a powerful, conservative, constraining influence on de-
bate. He also provides a welcome corrective to one-sided cri-
tiques of debate. He reveals the creative, probing, insightful 
dimensions of debate as well as its aesthetic appeal. He also 
artfully communicates how this social practice of debate can 
be a personally compelling, even transformative endeavor for 
the monk-scholars involved, while also noting its potential 
for sophistic misuse or rote shallow engagement. The book 
thus presents a balanced analysis of the socially embedded 
practices of Tibetan debate. 
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